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Abstract 
Undoubtedly, one of the major absurdities of Nigerian federalism well 
noted in the extant literature which has also been responsible for her 
convoluting character is structural imbalance. This paper took a 
cursory look at this anomaly in line with Mill’s law of federal 
stability. The paper reviewed all previous attempts at both state and 
locality creation exercises till date. The paper however inferred that it 
is imperative that the challenge of geo-political balancing is resolved 
if the polity will be stabilized. 
 





One of the absurdities of Nigerian federalism well noted in the 
extant literature as one of the factors responsible for her 
convoluting character is structural imbalance, created by the 
British colonial administration that handed over at 
independence a federation with a preponderant Northern 
Region, which was about a third of the entire federation both 
in land mass and population size. This lopsidedness 
undoubtedly is a negation of J.S. Mill’s law of federal stability, 
which posits that for a federation to be stable the component 
parts must be fairly equal in size. Coupled with minorities’ 
fear of marginalization, the quest by Nigerians, most 
especially the minorities, for the creation of their dream states 
has reached a crescendo. Thus, continuing fragmentation of 




to keep on demanding and insisting on creation of local 
government areas; all in an attempt to achieve geo-political 
balancing. 
Ever since 1954, when the minorities in the country first 
bombarded the then colonial government with an avalanche of 
requests for the creation of their autonomous divisions, in 
order to ensure equity and justice in an unfolding Nigerian 
federal structure; the demands for the creation of additional 
states and localities to the already existing ones by Nigerians 
have become a common place. From a federal structure of four 
units in 1960 (federal and three regions), now we have a 
staggering number of 37 units along with the federal capital 
territory and 774 local governments (Gboyega, 2003).  
It needs be reiterated that the experience of ethnic minorities 
worldwide has shown that several approaches can be adopted 
to manage the problem. These include: assimilation, ethnocide, 
genocide, constitutional safeguards, reversal of status and 
territorial solution, which otherwise is known as, state and 
locality creation. When this is to be done, to enhance national 
integration, a number of factors are equally taken into 
consideration. They are: (a) their land (territorial) areas (sizes); 
(b) their natural resources (in terms of economic viability; (c) 
their population size; and (d) the equality for living standard of 
their population (Obateru, 1995:8). In a perceptive work, 
Aaron Gana (1987), observed critically from Willink 
Commission of 1957 to the Politburo of 1986, that principal 
reasons advanced for creation of states can be classified into 
four viz: (a) to promote stability; (b) to promote unity and 
harmony; (c) to facilitate cultural authenticity and (d) to 
promote rapid development(Gana, 1987). An elder statesman – 
Chief Obafemi Awolowo – also opined that “ethnicity is the 
major factor to be considered as a criterion in creating any 
state in a federation so that minority groups in the midst of 
majority groups who differ in language, culture and historical 




background will not feel inferior”. In another work credited to 
the amendment of creation of Western Region, Awolowo came 
up with another set of criteria for creation of states in a 
federation like Nigeria thus: 
The Action Group (AG) had adopted two 
distinct but coordinated approaches to the issue 
of more states in Nigeria. The first approach is 
the idealistic one, while the second is the 
materialistic approach. The AG as a matter of 
fundamental principle believes that if the unity 
of this country is to be enduring and if our 
populace is to have a binding peace and 
happiness, each ethnic group or linguistic group 
in Nigeria must be assured of political self 
determination within the federation (Awolowo, 
1947:54).  
Another nationalist and elder statesman, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe 
also recommended a number of criteria for state creation based 
on ethnicity of which both the federal and state governments 
must be regrouped into various ethnic groups (Azikiwe, 1943).  
Both positions of Awolowo and Azikiwe premised on the 
basis of ethnicity and linguistic differences are meant to ensure 
national unity and stability. Their positions on the issue were 
supported strongly by James Coleman too (Coleman, 1965). 
Various scholars of federalism have also proffered a number of 
factors for state creation, among which are: (a) the need to 
minimize conflicts between states and among states, (b) the 
need for unity in the country, (c) the need for government to be 
nearer to the people, and (d) the need for maintenance of 
worthwhile cultural peculiarities and economic development 
(Adejuyigbe, 1979). The federal military government, while 
creating states in 1967 however adopted the following criteria: 
(a) recognition of federal principle, (b) geographical 




contiguity, (c) economic viability and uniformity and (d) 
administrative convenience.  
It is against this background that this paper examined the 
extent to which the fragmentation of Nigeria on six different 
occasions: 1963, 1967, 1976, 1987, 1991 and 1996 states’ 
creation exercises cum the creation of several localities have in 
any way enhanced national integration and geo-political 
balancing of Nigeria.  
This paper has a number of rubrics. With an introductory 
overview, the paper proceeded with the review of previous 
states creation exercises as regard the motive(s) that informed 
them. The second part dwelt on local government creations, 
using the 1991 population census to justify the reorganizations. 
The third part was an overview of states’ and local 
governments’ creation exercises using political, economic and 
demographic criteria to justify the exercise. This paper 
however infered that continuous fragmentation of the polity 
without taking adequate cognisance of population requirement 
is not good for the system. Moreso, that it has not really 
enhanced the much desired national integration and 
development. 
 
State Creation Exercises 
1963 Mid-Western Region Creation 
As rightly noted by Fred Onyeoziri (2002:13-16), an important 
aspect of the national question in Nigeria is the persisting 
conflict between the majority and minority ethnic groups. The 
latter always resented the old regional system for subjecting 
them to the domination of the majority groups. And not 
surprisingly, “the ethnic minorities in Nigeria has always 
expressed a preference for the creation of states along ethnic 
lines within a federal system” (Akinyele, 1990). 




It will be recalled that by 1953, minorities had become united, 
determined and vociferous in their demands for separate states 
in difference for the domination and eventual subjugation by 
the larger ethnic groups in the country. At this stage, however, 
the British colonial government was already washing its hands 
off the administration of the country and would not want to 
dabble into such rather touchy and sensitive issue as the 
creation of states. The best they could do in such circumstance 
was to set up a commission to look into the genesis of the 
grievances of minorities with a view to fashioning out devices 
that could guarantee their interests within an independent 
Nigeria. 
Between 1954 and 1960, when Nigeria got independence, the 
issue of minority groups and their place in emergent new 
Nigeria dominated the series of constitutional conferences that 
were held preceding the attainment of self-rule in 1960. What 
the minorities eventually got at independence in 1960 was a 
guarantee of their rights, especially as enshrined in the 1960 
independence constitution. In 1963, however, luck smiled on 
the minority groups in the then Western region. Mid-Western 
region was created out of the existing one, the then Premier of 
the Western region, Chief Obafemi Awolowo justified the 
creation of Mid-western region on the ground that the exercise 
would lead to even development pattern in the country 
(Lagunju, 1996:45). 
However, the excision of non Yorubas, partly Igbos, from the 
Western region in 1963 did not arise from a genuine concern 
by the nation’s leaders for the predicament of the minorities. 
Rather, the reorganization was part of a vindictive campaign 
by the then ruling federal coalition parties – the Northern 
Peoples Congress (NPC), and the Eastern-based National 
Council of Nigeria Citizens (NCNC), to destroy the main 
federal opposition party, the Action Group (AG), while 
resolutely resisting the statehood aspirations of the minorities 




in their respective home regions. Both the NPC and NCNC 
reaped enormous political and/ethnic benefits from their 
decision to cash-in on an intra-party crisis in the AG to declare 
a state of emergency in the West and subverted the region 
(Suberu, 1995:10-12). Whereas, the NPC leader, Sir Ahmadu 
Bello, resisted attempts to grant autonomy to the people of the 
Middle-Belt. He told Chief Obafemi Awolowo, that the people 
were the ‘property’ of his ancestors (Rewane, 1995:5). Long 
afterwards, Chief Awolowo had occasion to refer to the 
incident at one of the meetings of AG with its affiliates. The 
late J.S. Takar, leader of the United Middle Belt Congress 
(UMBC), vowed that he would rather die fighting for his 
people’s right to self-determination than allow the status quo 
to continue. The northern oligarchy’s demand for full regional 
autonomy, therefore, was intended to keep the Northern region 
as an indivisible political and administrative entity under its 
firm control. The Eastern region and the National Council of 
Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) also, were not then prepared to 
concede to the people of Calabar-Ogoja and River provinces 
(COR provinces), the right to self-determination (Suberu, 
Op.cit). Thus, the first effort at state creation was with 
acrimony and fierce party rivalry. Therefore, the exercise 
could neither have served as an integrating effort nor geo-
political balancing, which it was intended to be. 
1967 Twelve States Framework 
For about four years (1963-1967), there was a lull in the 
agitation for the creation of new states, borne out partly 
because of the constitutional problem that the new Nigerian 
nation had to grapple with. But more importantly because the 
various ethnic groups in the country had learned to tolerate and 
live together peacefully for the sake of the new federation. 
Then, the January 15, 1966 coup d’etat came which suspended 
the constitutionality of the country and imposed military rule 
on the polity at the return of normalcy. Because of the 
apprehension and fear by a section of the country and 




secession bid by that section of the country, that is, the 
easterners, the creation therefore on May 27, 1967 of twelve 
states structure from the existing four regions by the Gowon 
regime was indeed, an attempt to nip in the bud, the decision 
by the Ojukwu-led Eastern region to secede from the rest of 
the federation. Hitherto, the eastern region was treated as 
monolithic, but with the creation of the Rivers and the Cross 
Rivers States, the core Igbos of East lost the support and 
allegiance of the other tribes that formerly were united in 
single Eastern region. According to General Gowon, the 
creation of states must be done first, to remove the fear of 
domination. He expressed the hope that “representatives drawn 
from the new states will be more able to work out the future 
constitution for this country which can contain provisions to 
protect the powers of the states to the fullest extent desired by 
the Nigerian people” (Gown, 1986). 
It would be recalled that the establishment of a twelve state 
framework in 1967 derived from political ascendancy of new 
military-based ethno-political coalitions and the urgent need to 
under-cut the imminent secession of oil-rich Eastern region 
from the federation. The military counter-coup of July 1966, in 
particular, effectively transferred the reins of national power 
from ethnic majority politicians or their cohorts in the military 
to a minority dominated governing coalition into three new 
states, two of which comprised oil-rich minority populated 
areas, leaving the Igbo landlocked and economically isolated 
in the third state. A similar attempt to contain centrifugal 
pressures in the federation informed the excision of the 
colony/province of Lagos from the Western region, which thus 
became landlocked and less attractive or viable as a 
prospective independent Yorùbá republic. The Midwest region 
was left intact, while the north like the south was fragmented 
into six states.  In essence, the 1967 reform/reorganization not 
only ended the structural imbalance engendered by the 
disproportionate size of the North; it also created a federal 




structure in which the interests of minority ethnic groups and 
indeed the nation at large, could no longer be abused by 
anyone ethnic majority group. All of this was of course, 
consistent with the military’s emerging commitment at 
manipulating the state-structure to augment the hegemony of 
the center and tame the divisive tendencies inherent in 
Nigeria’s cultural diversity (Suberu, 1998:281-282). One 
aftermath of the 1967 states’ creation was that it served as an 
eye opener to the advantages and benefits that statehood can 
bestow on those people inhabiting such geographical divide. 
The result was that Nigerians were only held back in 
demanding for creation of new states from the existing ones; 
during the period 1967-1970 because of the civil strive in the 
country. 
1976 Nineteen States’ Structure 
The deluge started shortly after the cessation of hostilities in 
1970 as more and more Nigerians clamoured for the creation 
of their dream states from the existing ones. Agitation for 
creation of new states soon became a political issue and newly 
emergent politicians used the issue to canvass for votes and 
political support in their bid to gain the rein of governance 
especially from the Gowon regime, believed, then to have over 
stayed its usefulness. Little wonder therefore, when the 
Murtala Muhammed regime shortly on gaining power; set up 
the Justice Ayo Irikefe panel to look into the issue of states’ 
creation in the country. It was inaugurated on August 7, 1975 
with specific terms of reference to: 
(1) Advise on the delimitation of such states. 
(2) Advise on economic viability of the proposed states. 
(3) Advise on the location of administrative capitals of 
the proposed states. 
(4) To receive and examine written representations from 
individuals, groups, organizations or associations 
who may have views on the desirability or otherwise 




of creating states in particular areas (Ministry of 
Information, 1976).  
According to the white paper on the Irikefe panel, whose 
recommendations provided the basis for the reorganization of 
1976, 
… the basic motivation in the demand for more 
states is rapid economic development. All other 
reasons (most especially political) adduced by 
state agitators are in the view of the panel to a 
large extent mere rationalization to achieve the 
basic purpose of development (Ministry of 
Information, 1976).  
With this blunt acknowledgement of the economic rationale, 
state agitation in Nigeria must be related to the general 
ascendance of statehood as a pivot of distributive politics in 
the country (Suberu, 1991, 158-160). The 1976 states’ creation 
exercise was implemented in the wake of both a phenomenal 
expansion in federal petroleum export revenue allocation 
arrangements that enthroned inter-state equality as the pre-
eminent standard of financial devolution.  
That restructuring has some basic features. First, owing to the 
explicit association of state-creation with the devolution of 
central revenue, there was an official commitment to making 
the state as equal in population as possible. This was in order 
to ensure some per capital equity in the access of territorial 
communities to federal revenues. Consequently, many 
statehood requests were rejected on no other ground than their 
relatively limited population, which did not justify any 
reorganization. The palpable casualties of the policy were the 
numerically disadvantaged ethnic majority groups. In essence, 
while as many as six of the twelve states created in 1967 were 
majority-controlled units; only about seven of the nineteen 
states in 1976 could be regarded as ethnic minority states 
(Osaghae, 1986:158-160).   Moreover, as regards federal 




balancing, the nineteen states structure consisted of ten and 
nine states in the North and South respectively, thereby over 
turning the pre-existing equality between the admittedly more 
populous North and the apparently smaller South and regional 
inequality in the distribution of states has remained an 
important source of contention in the Nigerian federation. 
A second and related feature of the 1976 reorganizations as 
rightly observed by Suberu (1991) was the explicit 
transformation of the rationale for state-creation from its 
original role. As a sop for minority fears into a scheme for the 
dissemination of central revenue (derived mainly from 
southern ethnic minority communities) to predominantly 
ethnic majority populations. Henceforth, state-creation would 
cease to be a vehicle for extending political and economic self-
governance to distinct ethnic communities. Rather, it became 
an administrative strategy for the devolution of federal 
largesse to an omnibus and amorphous array of territorial 
communities and coalitions (Suberu, op.cit).  
Thirdly, partly in order to reduce the obviously insatiable 
distributive pressure for new states and nollify the numerous 
unsuccessful candidates for statehood, the 1976 
reorganizations were accompanied by a nationwide reform and 
revitalization of the local government system too. This reform 
which re-constituted the federation into 301 Local Government 
Areas (LGAs), sought to transform these governments into an 
effective third tier of Nigerian federation and genuine 
instrument for decentralization, development and democracy at 
the grassroots. 
Fourthly and finally, the 1976 reorganizations were explicitly 
linked to a programme of transition from military to civilian 
rule. Thus, the creation of new states was officially presented 
as a problematic and disruptive issue, which a ‘corrective’ 
military regime should resolve before handing-over power to 
civilian rulers. Unlike Gowon administration, which 




procrastinated on the issue of democratization and state-
creation, the Murtala-Obasanjo government saw the prompt 
resolution of the state issue and the disengagement of the 
military from politics as essential to its image and legitimacy 
as a corrective government. However, while the Murtala-
Obasanjo government correctly perceived the state issue as 
potentially equally capable of disrupting and delaying the 
process of demilitarization, it had resisted further agitation for 
changes to the nineteen-state structure. On this ground, its 
successive military regimes have been quite eager to use the 
issue as a ploy to legitimize and/or prolong military rule.  
Second Republic and Politics of State Creation 
Perhaps because state creation is a very fundamental issue, 
which can only be tackled with gut and determination, 
agitations for more states have always been more vociferous 
during military than civilian rules. In fact, apart from the Mid-
west (for political reasons discussed earlier), all other states 
were created during military administrations. However, during 
the Second Republic, agitation for more states went on 
unabated. Demand for new states was so volatile an issue in 
the Second Republic (1979-1983) (Graf, 1996:141), that none 
was eventually created till the collapse of that Republic. As it 
is well known, however, the attempts to create new states 
during this period were stymied by constitutional complexity, 
partisan acrimony, economic uncertainty and unfettered 
sectional recrimination and suspicion (Suberu, 1998).  
However, for the comprehensive list of demand for new states 
during the second republic, which were not granted, (see table 
1). 
But despite the National Assembly’s 29 proposed new states 
for referenda, no single state was created until the December 
31, 1993 military putsch of Buhari/Idiagbon duo. Their 
administration did not make any move to create states. In fact, 
political activities were outrightly banned. Table 2 shows the 




29 proposed states’ and local governments, which were 
eventually not created before another military putsch. 
1987 and 1991 States’ Creation 
With the coming into power of General Ibrahim Babangida in 
August 1985, states’ agitators demanded for the creation of 
more states. Their clamour gradually became profound and 
found responsive cord as soon as Babagida took over power. 
No sooner he assumed mantle of leadership than he set up the 
Political Bureau, headed by Dr. S.J. Cookey to look into the 
demands, by people, for the creation of more states in the 
country. Based on the recommendation of the Bureau, federal 
government in September 1987 created two more states – 
Katsina and Akwa Ibom, thus, making the number of states in 
the country to twenty-one. 
In an important sense, the 1987 state-creation exercise sought 
simply to complete the unfinished business of the 1976 
exercise. This is because the creation of Akwa Ibom had been 
explicitly recommended by the Irikefe Commission, while the 
Zaria-Katsina imbroglio in Kaduna state and the attendant 
agitation for the separation of the two communities have 
become extremely strident even before the military 
disengagement in 1979. An additional achievement of the 
1987 reorganizations was to make the number of states in the 
federation exactly divisible by three. This was widely 
considered necessary in order to avoid a return in the proposed 
Third Republic of the unfortunate constitutional cum electoral 
controversy in the federation, akin to the 122/3 legal debacle of 
1979 (Dudley, 1982:165-178).  
While the 1987 reorganizations genuinely appeared to be ‘in 
the national interest’, as claimed by Gen. Babangida, the 1991 
reform underscored both the continuing popular pressure for 
new states and Babangida’s desire to exploit these demands to 
promote his personal rulership project (Amuwo, 1995). The 
demands emanated largely from the Igbo intelligentsia and 




political leadership. These Igbo elements claimed, quite 
forcefully and persuasively, that they have been economically 
short-changed and politically marginalised in the various 
reorganizations of the federal structure since 1967. Babangida 
responded to this particular grievance by creating two new 
Igbo states – Abia and (new) Anambra and locating the capital 
of a third state, Delta in the Igbo city of Asaba. The six 
remaining states that were created in 1991 gave satisfaction to 
distributive pressures emanating from Hausa/Fulani and 
Yorùbá sub-groups (Jigawa, Kebbi and Osun) or responded to 
the need to extend political and economic decentralization to 
geographically large, administratively unwieldy and/or 
culturally incompatible areas (Kogi, Taraba and Yobe). 
However, the location of five of the nine states in the North 
compounded the problems of geo-political balancing vis-à-vis 
the distribution of states. The new thirty-state structure 
consisted of sixteen states in the North against only fourteen in 
the South. The minorities were similarly short-changed; they 
had only twelve of the thirty states. 
The 1991 re-organizations trivialized and bastardized the 
process of territorial reform in Nigeria. The creation of the 
nine new states and the accompanying reorganizations of the 
localities were done in a precipitate and prejudiced manner. 
Consequently, rather than promoting national integration, the 
re-organizations provoked an unprecedented orgy of protests, 
demonstrations and riots involving tens of fatalities (Johnson, 
1991).  
 
The 1996 Re-Organizations 
With the coming into power of General Sani Abacha, those 
clamouring for states’ creation seemed to redouble their call 
for more states. General Abacha himself made 
pronouncements supporting the rights, especially as the issue 
of creating new states was concerned. Thus, following the 




recommendation of the disbanded National Constitutional 
Conference (NCC), on the need to create more states, General 
Abacha set up the committee for states creation, local 
government and boundary adjustment. Consequently, he 
appointed Chief Arthur Mbanefo as its chairman. Immediately 
on assumption of office, the committee requested for the 
submission of memoranda from members of the public and set 
January 15, 1996 as the deadline. At the end of the day, 2,369 
demands for local governments and 280 boundary adjustments 
were made (Daily Times, 1996:12).  
The Committee received a total of seventy-two requests for 
new states (twenty-seven requests more than the number 
received by the Constitutional Conference). See Table 3 for 
comprehensive list. 
Although, the committee made specific recommendations for 
the creation of some states and local governments, such 
proposals were never published, and the government itself did 
not publish any white paper on the committee’s report.  
Nevertheless, on the occasion of the country’s thirty sixth 
anniversary on 1st October, 1996, General Abacha announced 
the creation of six new states as follows: 
Bayelsa with headquarters at Yenagoa was 
created out of Rivers State. Ebonyi with 
headquarters at Abakaliki, was excised from 
Abia and Enugu States. Ekiti with capital at 
Ado-Ekiti, emerged from Ondo State. Gombe 
with headquarters at Gombe, was excised from 
Bauchi State. Nasarawa, with capital at Lafia, 
was created out of Plateau State. Zamfara, with 
headquarters at Gusau emerged from Sokoto 
State (Ibid).  
 




The analysis could go on and on, but for space constraints, we 
now turn to Local Government creation exercises before we 
use 1991 demographic data to argue whether there are more 
or less local governments in each state based on their 
population sizes. 
Creation of Local Governments 
What is said above of the fragmentation of Nigeria into 36 
states is also true of the 774 local government areas. The 
number of local governments has grown from 299 (1976) to 
774 (1999). These local governments are uniform in structures, 
have the same functions, similar sources of revenue and share 
common relationships with the federal and state governments 
(Gboyega, 2003:24). The Census News, based on the 1991 
population census, however, listed only 541 (five hundred and 
forty-one) local government areas (Census News, 1992). See 
tables 5 and 6 for the population sizes of the states and 
population range of states and local governments. 
 
Like the states, Local Governments’ population sizes 
exclusively vary from 24,825 (for Ibeju Lekki) to 1,011,808 
(for Ojo) both of which are in Lagos State. Set out in Tables 5 
and 6 is the classification of the population of the 541 Local 
Government Areas into twelve (12) population categories. The 
class interval of the first two (2) groups is 50,000 while those 
of the remaining ten (10) classes are 100,000. Of the 
remaining 531 Local Government Areas, 52.1 percent (118) 
are in the 50,000 to 100,000 class and 17.2 percent (93) in the 
200,001 to 300,000 class. This means that approximately 31 
percent (69.3) precisely of them are in the class of 100,000 to 
300,000. 
In table 5, the average population of the 541 Local 
Government areas is 163,600 (163,600 precisely) obtained by 
dividing the country’s 1991 population of 88.5 million by 541. 
Set out in columns 2, 3, and 4 of the tables are respectively, 




the populations of the states and the numbers of their local 
government areas that extensively vary from 95,000 (for Abuja 
FTC) and 474,167 (for Kebbi State) population wise. 
In column five is the number of local government areas which 
each state should have based on their national average 
population of 163,600. The figures in the column are obtained 
by dividing the population of each state by 163,600. In the last 
column of the table are the standard deviations from their 
national quotas of local government areas they are entitled to, 
based on the national average of 163,600. 
The figures in the column are preceded by plus and minus 
signs to indicate the numbers of local government areas which 
they possess above and below their national quota while zero 
implies possession of their normal national quotas. The figures 
in column five are subtracted from those in column three to 
obtain those in column six. 
Seventeen states possess 1 to 10 local government areas above 
their national quotas while twelve possess 1 to 23 below their 
national quotas. It is only two states (Kwara and Jigawa) that 
possess their normal national quotas of local government areas 
when juxtaposed by their population sizes. Akwa Ibom State 
exceeds its national quota by ten (10), its national quota should 
be 14 but presently has 24. Osun State should have 13 but has 
22; Lagos State should have 35 but has only 12, a shortfall of 
23. 
Since the national average population of the 541 local 
government areas is 163,600, Obateru, suggested that the 
maximum population size of any local government area should 
be 100,000. This means that the population range of local 
government areas should be 100,000 to 300,000. The two 
basic factors to be considered in determining their population 
sizes within the range should be their natural resources and the 
living standards of their residents. There should be a kind of 




correlation between the population sizes of local government 
areas and the performance of their levels of governments. 
Consequently, population of 100,000 to 200,000 is suggested 
for the more developed ones and 200,000 to 300,000 for less 
developed ones. If the population range is accepted, then the 
number of local government population classes in the table 6 
reveals that there is need to merge some local government 
areas in most of the states, while the four states of Lagos, 
Kaduna, Kano and Katsina have good cases for more local 
government areas (Obateru, 1995:9). 
Agreed that creation of additional local government areas in a 
plural federal system is not an aberration, in the sense that as 
posited by Morton (1960), it is difficult to find any 
governmental activity which does not involve all three of the 
so-called “levels” of the federal system. In the most local of 
local functions – law enforcement or education, for example, 
the federal and state governments play important roles. In 
what, a priori may be considered the purest central 
government activities – the conduct of foreign affairs, for 
example, the state and local governments have considerable 
responsibilities, directly and indirectly. But where these local 
governments are financial liabilities which deepen local 
governments’ financial dependency, this is adverse and 
counterproductive because decentralization which necessitated 
their creation is eventually undermined by absence of local 
authorities’ own revenues (Mawhood, 1983).  Therefore, the 
rationale of fragmenting Nigeria’s federal system into several 
localities not only to enhance effective decentralization, which 
is the hallmark of federalism, but also to enhance 
administrative efficiency is far from been achieved. 
State and Locality Creation: Implications for Nigeria’s 
Development and Geo-Political Balancing 
Despite the high figure of both the number of states and 
localities in Nigeria, with demand for more still unabated, the 




question that bothers on this segment of the paper is: how 
many states and local governments are ideal for this federation 
and are the created ones in any way further both integrative 
and development guests of the country? While there is a 
considerable merit in the demands, as regards development, it 
is noteworthy that there are two approaches to achieving 
equitable spatial spread of economic development: (a) through 
the creation of more states and local government areas; and (b) 
through effective engagement in physical (spatial) planning 
which is sometimes referred to as Urban and Regional 
Planning. From economic viability consideration however, 
there appears to be no justification for the creation of more 
states in Nigeria in the foreseeable future as virtually all the 
existing thirty-six (36) states are not economically viable. 
Apart from Lagos State, which has tried to balance its budget 
since its creation, all other states have had to depend on the 
federal government for survival. This then presupposes that if 
the issue of availability of resources as pivotal for creating 
states is considered, then only Lagos State can be said to meet 
such consideration. Nigerians are saddled with unviable states, 
which cannot muster the least economic muscle required for 
autonomous political units.  
The gap between statutory allocations and internally generated 
revenue is too wide. A situation whereby a state cannot 
generate the money needed to pay workers’ salaries is not 
good enough. This trend does not only continue but financial 
condition of the states is also more precarious. The current 
revenue allocation system does not help the states too. It gives 
the federal government – 48.5%; state governments – 24%; 
local governments – 20% and special funds (administered by 
the federal governments) – 7.5%. Thus, effectively, the 
Federal Government administers 56% of the federal account. It 
is noteworthy that state and local governments have mounted 
intense agitation since return to civil rule to revise the 
allocation formula in their favour. 




Nevertheless, rapid rise in the number of states in the recent 
past, “has, no doubt, led to the multiplication of personnel and 
administrative facilities in the public sector, to the extent that, 
taken together, the entire public sector in the country is doing 
no more than the payment of salaries” (Ode, 1996).  Yet there 
are 36 states and requests still unabated for more. In a 
federation like this, whereby the federal government plays 
‘Father Christmas’, for the states to survive, it has a lot of 
negative consequences for the federal system. Beyond state 
creation for political reasons, it is high time we took economic 
viability as a factor into consideration. It is a negation of 
federal tenets to create level(s) of government without 
financial muscle. 
Agitators for more states are unconscious of the fact that 
proliferation of states in the federation is capable of reducing 
the political power of such states. Larry Diamond was right 
when he stated that: 
The greater the number of states, the weaker and 
less viable individual states will become, with 
the direct consequence that the centre would 
actually gather more power and initiative 
(Diamond, 1987). 
Thus, continuous creation of states and local governments may 
reduce their power to check the abuse of an overbearing 
federal centre. While big states can threaten the corporate 
existence and stability of the federation, small states 
neutralizes the deterrence effect of states in inter-state and 
centre-state relations as rightly observed by Ayoade (1988:20, 
21). It is not likely therefore, that a single state or few states 
can confront the federal centre like in the secessionist attempt 
of 1967. But this does not mean that there will be no 
disaffection anymore. In fact, political disaffection may 
increase as the states’ capability for ventilating their 
grievances decreases.  




Few states in the federation appear adequately viable on 
account of strength of their secondary and tertiary industries as 
earlier noted. When one considers table 5, vis-à-vis the 1991 
population census with 30 states and federal territory then, the 
population sizes of the states vary from 1.41m (for Yobe State) 
to 5.69m (for Lagos State). This wide variation is equally 
evident in their annual revenues and expenditures, with the 
consequential effect of uneven development. Though, there is 
hardly any federation with fairly equal component parts, but 
the wide disproportionality is a source of concern in Nigeria. 
The irony of it all is that India with a far larger population size 
than Nigeria has twenty-five states, while Nigeria with 36 is 
still clamouring for more (Ordershook and Shertura, 1997:27). 
In the first place, it is now widely recognized that the 
successive changes in the internal territorial configuration of 
the federation have served more to satisfy the distributive 
ambitions of the three ethnic majority formation of 
Hausa/Fulani, Yorùbá and Igbo, than to assuage the fears of 
the politically vulnerable ethnic minority communities. For 
this reason, the Ijaw community had trenchantly denounced 
the 36-state structure then as fraudulent and a ‘clear 
embodiment of the usual bankruptcy’ of the Nigerian system 
of federalism (The Guardian, 1994:A14). 
Second, territorial changes in Nigeria have often spawned 
profound disagreement over the choice, ethno-territorial 
composition and localities and over the disposition of the 
assets and personnel of the old units from which the new ones 
had been excised. These disagreements are often compounded 
if not generated in the first place, by the arbitrariness arising 
from the creation of virtually all the states and localities by 
military fiat (except the 1963 one) rather than by popular 
ratification and/or constitutional legislation and proclamation. 
What is more, the creation of new states and local 
governments immediately fuel pressures for discrimination 




against new classes of so-called ‘non-indigenes’, that is, 
Nigerians resident in states or local governments other than 
their own. All of this makes the creation of new states and 
localities in Nigeria an extremely divisive and disruptive 
exercise. 
Thirdly, Nigeria’s internal territorial reforms have remained 
pathetically inconclusive, as each successive exercise in state 
and local re-organization has merely spawned new minorities’ 
antipathies and agitations for new states and localities. The 
cyclical character of territorial changes in Nigeria contrasts 
sharply with experiences in most other federations, where 
initially reforms of states and/or local boundaries have been 
followed by period of fairly stable consensus on the internal 
territorial configuration or morphology of the federal system 
(McHenry, 1986).  Fourth, as Nigeria continues to totter under 
the impact of its worst economic crisis since independence, the 
negative economic or financial implication of establishing new 
states and localities are becoming increasing obvious. Beyond 
the expansion of bureaucratic and physical infrastructure in the 
newly established administrative headquarters, the 
developmental (as distinct from distributive) value of new 
financial devolution which accrues to the new constituent units 
from the revenue sharing system is immediately consumed by 
administrative overheads and new patronage positions, which 
leaves little resources for real development. 
Fifth, there is the general realization in Nigeria that, far from 
reflecting a genuine desire officially to resolve some 
continuing anomalies or inequalities in the federal territorial 
structure, the creation of new states and localities is being 
promoted and manipulated by the military as a way of 
prolonging and undermining the re-democratization project. 
Not surprisingly, the creation of new states and local 
governments has featured prominently in the contentious and 
rather circuitous political transition programmes of both 




Generals Babangida and Abacha. The experience in the current 
democratic experiment is interesting. Most of the state 
governors were creating additional and local governments at 
will despite the fact that hitherto, these local governments 
suffered from both administrative inertia and financial 
amnesty. With transition to a new government in 2003, they all 
suffered natural death. It was in this state of confusion that the 
federal government set up another panel to review the local 
government system in Nigeria. The outcome of the panel’s 
recommendations and government’s white paper are still being 
awaited. 
Conclusion 
At a time of deep dissatisfaction and intensive frustration with 
the over-centralization of the federal system, the repeated 
creation or proliferation of new constituent units can only 
compound the imbalance in the inter-governmental system. 
Moreover, the direct role of the federal government in re-
organizing the boundaries and redefining the structure of 
localities is a blatant centrist assault on the received federal 
doctrine regarding the rights of state administration and local 
populations to determine the nature of local authorities without 
taking into consideration local peculiarities (Suberu, 1995).  
According to Bola Ige (1995), today, Nigeria is the only 
country in the world, which says it is federal but where local 
government affairs are directed from the Federal Capital. It is 
so bad that since 1988, primary education nation-wide also has 
been planned and funded directly from the federal capital 
through the activities of National Primary Education 
Commission (NPEC) (The News, 1998).  If such centrist 
tendencies could be jettisoned, then, Nigerians may have to be 
re-orientated on how to live peacefully together in a federal 
set-up rather than stimulating the demand for more states. 
What we discovered was that continuous fragmentation will 
only serve to foster the growth of more sub-nationality 
competition against the nationalism of the nation-state. And 




since it has created more minorities, it means the policy has 
failed as an antidote to fear of ethnic domination. Although 
even development has become its new rationale it has still 
failed to bring about even development. Dependence on 
federal support too seems to have increased the intensity and 
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Table 1: 49 Formal Requests for New States in Nigeria October 1979 
– June 1983 
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Sources: Adapted from R.T. Suberu, “The Struggle for New State in 
Nigeria, 1976-1990” African Affairs, 1991), 90, p.504. Also, see, Report of 
the Isa Obaro Committee on State Creation. Sunday Sketch, Ibadan, 12 June, 
1993. 
 




Table 2: 29 Proposals for New States Recommended for Referenda 
by the National Assembly (1979-1983) 
Existing 
State 



















































































































Table 3: The 45 Requests For New States Received By The 
























































































































































































Ile-Ife or Ilea 
Ogbomoso or 
Oyo 
































Source: Adapted from Report of the Committee on State Creation. The 
Report of the National Constitutional Conference, 1995. 
Key:  NM  - Northern Minorities 

















































































































































































































































































































































































 Total 88.51 541 163,600   
Source: Remi Obateru, “Stop Fragmenting Nigeria”, Nigerian 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Total 88.51 541 14 118 282 93 17 7 1 4 2 1 1 
 %   2.6 21.8 52.1 17.2 3.1 1.3 .2 .7 .4 .2 .2 
Source: Census News, NPC, Abuja, September, 1992, Vol. 3, No.1 
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